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Abstract
This paper studies the behaviour of rms facing the decision to cre-
ate a patent fence, dened as a portfolio of substitute patents. We set
up a patent race model, where rms can decide either to patent their
inventions, or to rely on secrecy. It is shown that rms build patent
fences, when the duopoly prots net of R&D costs are positive. We
also demonstrate that in this context, a rm will rely on secrecy when
the speed of discovery of the subsequent invention is high compared
to the competitors. Furthermore, we compare the model under the
First-to-Invent and First-to-File legal rules. Finally, we analyze the
welfare implications of patent fences.
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"You have to evaluate what you have done and say, OK, does this have com-
mercial value? If it has commercial value, you want to build a fence around it."
Neil Howell, molecular biologist, cited in Science, Next Wave, October 22nd 2003.
1 Introduction
A number of explanations have been proposed to explain the rapid growth in
patenting since the mid 1980s. This worldwide growth has been described,
e.g., in Hall (2005) and OECD (2004). Kortum and Lerner (1997) asso-
ciate this growth with an increased R&D productivity and changes in the
management of innovation, while Gallini (2002) suggests that the growth
in patenting in the US can be explained by legal changes, what she calls
a "pro-patent" shift, that extended patent rights to new subject matters
(e.g. business methods and software patents). Regarding Europe, one could
think that the creation of the European Patent O¢ ce (EPO) in 1978 can
partly explain the growth in patenting, since it has considerably reduced the
application costs.
Another reason could be that rms patent in a more "strategic" way,
in the sense that the patent application is not only driven by the desire to
protect innovation rents (see for instance, Rivette and Kline, 2000). Cohen et
al. (2000) in a survey at the rm level, found that the most prominent motives
for patenting include the prevention of rivals from patenting related invention
(patent blocking), the use of patents in negotiations and the prevention
of suits. However, rms patent for di¤erent reasons in discrete product
industries, in which an invention can be protected by a limited number of
patents and in complex product industries, where a single patent is not
enough to protect an invention. More precisely, rms will patent a coherent
group of inventions, which form what is sometimes called a patent "bulk",
aimed at protecting one product. The "bulk" can either be a "fence" of
substitute patents or a "thicket" of complementary patents (see Reitzig, 2004
and Cohen et al., 2000).
In complex product industries, where innovation is highly cumulative,
rms use patents to force rivals into negotiations and, as a consequence, they
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create thicketsof complementary technologies. This is a similar argument
as in Hall and Ziedonis (2001). As a consequence, rms have to face legal
challenges in order to acquire rights to outside technologies.
In discrete product industries, rms use patents to block the development
of substitutes by rivals. We say that rms create fences. Firms wishing
to protect some patented core invention, may patent substitutes to keep
rivals from doing this. Substitute inventions are dened as inventions which
resemble one another functionally (following the denition given by Cohen et
al, 2000)1. As an example of a patent fence, Hounshell and Smith (1988) refer
to the case of Nylon. In the 1940s, Du Pont patented over 200 substitutes for
Nylon. The patents consisted of a range of molecular variations of polymers
with similar properties to Nylon.
While the issue of "thickets" of complementary technologies in cumula-
tive innovations has been extensively analyzed2, as well as the institutional
solutions to overcome this problem (Lerner and Tirole, 2005 and Shapiro,
2001), little attention has been paid to fencing patents so far.
Our contribution in this paper will be to study the incentives of rms to
build patent "fences" by allowing di¤erent levels of competition and analyze
some preliminary welfare implications.
The starting point of our model is that two rms have private informations
about two potential substitute innovations. Given their expected prots,
both rms choose whether to invest or not to nd the rst product. We will
consider two scenarios. The rst model is a simple patent race in which the
leader (i.e. the rm that found the invention) patents the product. Then,
we are going to extend the model by allowing the leader to choose between
patenting the invention or keeping it secret.
After the leader has patented the invention or kept it secret, a second race
1A more precise denition of patent fences can be found in Granstrand (1999):
This refers to a situation where a series of patents, ordered in some way, block certain
lines or directions of R&D, for example, a range of variants of a chemical sub-process,
molecular design, geometric shape, temperature conditions or pressure conditions. Fencing
is typically used for a range of possibly quite di¤erent technical solutions for achieving a
similar functional result.
2See Scotchmer (2005) for an overview on cumulative innovations.
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takes place where both rms choose whether or not to invest in developing
a substitute to the rst invention. We will assume that the expected time
of discovery of the second invention will di¤er, depending on whether the
leader has kept the rst innovation secret or not. If the leader has patented
the rst product, both rms will race at the same speed, as all the information
is disclosed in the patent document. However, if the rst invention has been
kept secret, there is no disclosure to the follower, so that the leader will race
faster than the follower.
In addition, the rst inventor can collect an interim prot by commer-
cializing the product, only if it has been patented. This comes from an
assumption that there is an instantaneous disclosure, if the product based
on the invention is commercialized.
In the context of our model, a fence can be dened as a portfolio composed
by both patents. As we dened it above, both products are close (non-
improving) substitutes. Thus, the fact that a rm produces one or both
inventions does not change the prot, if this rm is a monopolist. However,
if the rms have to share the market, i.e., if each of them owns a patent, the
prots will depend on the degree of competition.
Applying the First-to-File and First-to-Invent legal rules, we nd that
rms potentially create fences of substitute inventions, when the duopoly
prots net of R&D costs are positive. When we allow for secrecy, we show
that rms will rely on secrecy, when the speed of discovery of the subsequent
invention is high, relative to the competitors. The intuition behind this
result is the following: if competition is strong, the expected duopoly prots
are negative, thus the follower will not invest, as this choice is not protable.
Moreover, if the degree of competition is low, it might be protable for the
rival rm to enter the market and for the leader to accommodate as well as
collect an interim prot. On the other hand, the leading rm will keep the
invention secret when the technological gap between both inventions is high
in order to race faster than the follower for the remaining invention.
Moreover, we demonstrate that a patent fence is socially sub-optimal
when it is created with certainty.
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The issue of substitute inventions is commented upon in Denicolò (2000),
whose model describes two-stage patent races with a substitute innovation
at each step of the model. In this model, business stealingoccurs when a
rm enters the market and "steals" market shares from the incumbent. It
is shown that this indeed reduces investment in the rst race and increases
it in the second one. This model allows for free entry in both races, which
makes the likelihood that the leader (i.e. the rm, which patented the rst
invention) wins the second innovation tend to zero. Thus, rms can never
build fences.
Jensen and Thursby (1996) study an international patent race, where
two rms race to develop products that are close substitutes. They focus
on the case in which the national authorities set up a "standard" on the
market, which requires new products to be compatible with the previous
ones, in order to privilege the products developed domestically. As well as
in Denicolò (2000), this model does not allow for fence creation, since the
domestic invention will be protected by the "product standard".
Trade secrecy has been applied to various situations, for instance, in order
to prevent imitation (Gallini, 1992 or Anton and Yao, 2004), to get a head
start in cumulative innovations (Scotchmer and Green, 1990)3 or to mislead
rivals (Langinier, 2005). Even though a rm can use a previous invention to
nd a substitute product in our model, the concept of "patent fence" di¤ers
slightly from the notion of "imitation". In our model the leading rm can
also decide to invest in a substitute, which is not the case in the imitation
models, see for instance Gallini (1992), where only the imitator invests in the
second stage. A patent fence can be viewed as an innovator who decides to
imitate its own products, in order to avoid a rival rm doing it.
The following paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the
assumptions of the model. In section 3, we study a simple patent race. The
model is then extended to allow for secrecy in First-to-File and First-to-
Invent in section 4. In section 5, we discuss the welfare e¤ects of patent
3In their model, the rms actually have the possibility to "suppress" an innovation,
but this has the same consequences as keeping it secret.
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fences. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Basic assumptions
Let us assume that two rms, say A and B, are competing to patent two
substitute innovations (in demand), say 1 and 2 in a multiple stages patent
race. Allow both products to be non-infringing, otherwise the question of
interest disappears. This assumption implies that the patent breadth has
to be relatively narrow4. We assume our products to be substitutes in de-
mand, but not cumulative innovations (in other words, the products are not
improving on each other).
Let us suppose that there is a given number of consumers, willing to
pay for the product and indi¤erent between the di¤erent versions. If a rm
has a monopoly position on the market, then its prot is normalized to 1.
Given that both products are substitutes, the previous assumption means
that it does not make a di¤erence in terms of prots, whether a rm owns
one or both patents, as long as the rival rm does not have any of them.
If the rms have one patent each, they have to share the market. Their
duopoly prots are indexed by  2 [0; 0:5] where  = 0 corresponds to a
Bertrand competition with homogeneous goods and  = 0:5 mirrors weak
competition, e.g., collusion between the rms. Thus,  can be seen as a
measure of agressivity of competition.
Let us also assume, in order to simplify, an innite patent life, which does
not qualitatively change the results.
Following that, we are going to study two models. The rst one is a
simple patent race in which the inventors do not have the option to keep
their inventions secret (section 3). Then, we are going to extend the model
to the case, in which the rst inventor can keep its invention secret (section
4).
4The patent "breadth" species how di¤erent another product must be in order not
to infringe. See Scotchmer (2005). This assumption corresponds to the "weak novelty
requirement" in Scotchmer and Green (1990).
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3 A simple patent race model
In the rst place, we consider a model in which the rst innovator patents
the product. The timing of the game is given in gure 1.
Figure 1: Timing of the simple patent race
Firm A has an
invention and patents
it
First invention
A and B choose to
invest in a second
race or not
A and B: inital
decision to enter
the game or not
End of the game
Second invention
Time
3.1 Stage one
In a rst stage, the rms have to decide whether they are going to enter the
race by investing in R&D (I) or not (N), based on their expected and dis-
counted payo¤s. The arrival process of innovations is modeled as in, Scotch-
mer and Green (1990) and Denicolò (1996, 2000): assuming an exponential
distribution, the probability that a rm is successful at a date  prior to t
is Pr [  t] = 1   e t, where  is the instantaneous probability of success
for each rm (the Poisson hit rateor hazard function). Furthermore, we
assume the values of  to be identical and independent for both rms, as
they have the same information at this stage. The aggregate instantaneous
probability of success is then the sum of the individual probabilities. It fol-
lows that the expected innovation time for each rm is E () = 1=: If the
rms choose to invest, they will then pay a R&D cost of c per unit of time
during the discovery process, until the rst invention is discovered. In this
line of thought, we assume that they have limited resources, so that they can
only invest in one innovation at a time.
One rm is going to get the rst invention, and be what we call "the
leader". In order to simplify, we will denote rm A as the leader.
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3.2 Stage two
In the second stage, rms have to make another investment decision for
the remaining invention. The situations di¤er in the models we study. We
make the assumption that having the rst invention is an advantage for the
continuation of the game. Thus, we will assume that the leader races faster
than before. This is formalized by introducing a larger hazard rate,  > 
for the leader. This assumption can be justied by the fact that having an
invention can be an advantage for the second race, in the sense that the
technologies used for both inventions may be close and that know-how in
this specic eld is acquired.
Once the rst invention is discovered by the leader, it is immediately
patented. As the information on the invention is disclosed through the patent
document, the follower can use it. As a consequence, both rms race at the
same speed () if they decide to invest. However, the leader collects an
interim prot by commercializing the product.
3.3 Equilibria
The game is solved by backward induction, thus we will begin with the last
stage of the game.
Let us begin at the point where the rst innovator, rm A, has patented
the invention. Both rms have to choose whether they are going to invest
(choice I) or not (choice N) in the second invention.
If both rms invest, each of them will achieve the second innovation with
the same probability in the period dt. The expected date of discovery is the
same for both rms and has an exponential distribution with parameter 2
as each rm has an instantaneous probability  of innovating. In addition,
each rm will pay a R&D cost c per unit of time which ends when one of the
rms invents.
In dt, with a probability of , rm A is the rst to discover the invention
and gets a ow of prot of 1=r forever, where r > 0 is the interest rate. We
will assume that the expected monopoly prot is positive: 1
r
> c, otherwise
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the rms would not enter initially. In the same time interval, with a prob-
ability , B gets the invention and A will have to share the prot and get
=r. In addition, A will also get the interim prot of the rst invention until
the second invention is patented. The probability of two discoveries in any
interval of size dt is negligible when dt tends to 0.
Thus, As continuation value is:
+1Z
0
e (2+r)t



1
r
+

r

+ 1  c

dt
=

 
1
r
+ 
r

+ 1  c
2+ r
(1)
The reasoning is similar for B in dt. If A is the rst to discover the
invention, with a probability of , B will get a ow of prot of 0, as it does
not own any patent. If B is the rst to invent, the value of the nal invention
will be the duopoly prot, =r. B does not get any interim prot, but has
of course to pay the R&D cost. Bs continuation payo¤ is:

 

r
  c
2+ r
(2)
The other payo¤s are derived in the same fashion. Table 1 represents
the expected continuation payo¤ matrix for the sub-game, after the leader
has patented. It is assumed that the rms can deviate at any point in time,
from investment to non-investment and vice versa, between the patenting
decision and the date of discovery of the second invention. However, it can
be demonstrated that it is optimal for the rms to take one-time decisions
whether to invest or not. In addition, we will only focus on equilibria in pure
strategies.
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Table 1: Continuation payo¤s after A has patented the rst invention
B
A
I N
I
( 1r+

r )+1 c
2+r
;
(r ) c
2+r
 1
r
+1 c
+r
;0
N 

r
+1
+r
;

r
 c
+r
1
r
+ 1;0
It is obvious that the results would be symmetric in the case Firm B had
been the rst patentee.
Remark 1 In the sub game following As decision to patent, rm A only
invests in the second invention when rm B also does.
Proof. 1
r
+ 1 >
( 1r )+1 c
+r
;8 2 [0; 1]; c > 0 and r > 0
The interpretation is that if B does not invest in the second race, A is
better o¤ by not investing, as the expected gain is the same but there is no
R&D cost to incur.
Table 2 gives the conditions under which the di¤erent choices are Nash
equilibria in the sub game. Regarding the notation in the column labelled
"decisions", the rst letter refers to As decision in the second race, and the
second one refers to Bs choice. The notation will always follow this logic
hereafter.
Table 2: Conditions for having a Nash equilibrium in the sub game where A patents
Decisions Conditions
II  < 1  cr(+r)
2
and 
r
> c
NI  > 1  cr(+r)
2
and 
r
> c
NN 
r
< c
Consider now the entry in the game where both rms have to decide
whether or not to invest in the initial product. At this stage, each rm has a
probability one half of being in position A or B if both rms enter. Scotchmer
and Green (1990) showed that there is no possibility of having asymmetric
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equilibria of the ex ante entry game (i.e., it is not possible that only one rm
enters the race) in their model. This is also the case in this model; both rms
make the same decision.
In order to simplify, we will assume that the Poisson hit rates are identical
at each stage,  = , as this does not a¤ect the results for the moment. The
ex ante prots depend on the choices made at the second stage. For each
choice at the second stage, rms get the payo¤ to A (in table 1) with a
probability , and they get the payo¤ to B with probability . By that
means, we can determine a lower bound on  for both rms to enter the race
(table 3).
Table 3: Lower bound on  for positive ex ante prots.
Decisions at the second stage Conditions
II rc(2+1) r 
2
22
NI r[c(1+) ]
22
NN Entry always optimal
Our analysis will be based on the cases, in which both rms initially enter
the race. Thus, we will assume that the ex ante prots are positive (i.e. the
conditions in table 3 hold):
A1:  > rc(2+1) r 2
22
A2:  > r[c(1+) ]
22
The equilibria are summarized in gure 2 for a given r. The solid curve
indicate the equilibria of the second race, while the dashed curves indicate
the direction to which these curves move when the cost (c) increases. Finally,
the shaded areas show where ex-antes prots would be negative if both rms
entered (table 3). The regions are labelled according to the optimal choices
that apply. "Entry" means that both rms initially enter the race, and the
following letters indicate the optimal choice of, respectively, the leader (the
winner of the rst race) and the follower.
From tables 1 and 2, we derive the following result.
11
Figure 2: Equilibria of the patent race
Corollary 2 If the expected duopoly prots are negative, i.e. 
r
< c, none
of the rms is going to invest in the second product. If the duopoly prots
are positive, there exist a threshold of  function of ,  = 1   cr(+r)
2
, so
that for  <  both rms invest in the second product, whereas for  > ,
only the follower will invest.
The intuition behind this result is the following: if the expected duopoly
prots are negative, the follower is not going to invest. As a consequence,
the leader will not invest either, to avoid a duplication of R&D costs which
would not increase its prot.
If the duopoly prots are positive, the follower will invest, but the choice
of the leader will depend on the degree of competition as well as the expected
time of discovery. The leader will only invest if the speed of discovery is high.
Our motivation was to study the process of creating a patent fence sur-
rounding some core invention5. We now turn to this question by rst dening
what can be called a "fence" in this model.
Denition 3 A fence is created when one of the rms owns patents for both
inventions.
5The "core invention" denotes here the invention that will actually be marketed.
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In other words, a fence can potentially be created when the winner of the
rst race also invests in the second race.
Proposition 4 A potential fence is created in the region Entry/II, in which
the duopoly prots are positive and the speed of discovery is high.
Proof. This result follows from corollary 2 and denition 3
Positive duopoly prots reect the fact that the degree of competition is
low. An increase of the cost of the innovation widens the NN region. At the
limit, if the cost is such that the duopoly prot is negative for any values of
 and , non-investment for both rms will be the only outcome.
4 A patent race with secrecy
We now extend the previous model by allowing the winner of the rst race
to choose between patenting the invention or keeping it secret. If the leader
chooses to patent the invention, we will again assume that the invention is
fully disclosed and that the follower can use it. The leader also collects an
interim prot by marketing the product. Thus, the results will be identical
to those in section 3 if the leader chooses to patent the invention.
On the other hand, if the leader chooses secrecy, there is no disclosure
at all, which allows the leader to race faster than the laggard, but since
the product is not marketed during this stage, the leader cannot collect any
prots before the next invention is made6.
Figure 3 shows the timing of the game, which is detailed in the following
discussion.
We will study the model under two alternative legal systems, the First-to-
File and First-to-Invent rules. In most countries, if two people independently
make the same invention, the patent is awarded to the rst one to le a patent
application. The United States have a First-to-Invent system, in which the
rst inventor gets the patent if he can prove earlier inventorship, even if he
led an application later.
6This is a standard assumption in the literature, as it is usually assumed that if the
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Figure 3: Timing of the game in which secrecy is allowed
First invention
B observes A’s
decision.
A and B choose to
invest in a second
race or not
A and B: inital
decision to enter
the game or not
- If the first invention has been patented: end
of the game
- If the first invention has been kept secret:
potential new discovery races (see text)
Second invention
Time
Firm A has an
invention and decides:
- to patent it
- to keep it secret
4.1 The model under secrecy in First-to-Invent
Consider the stage in which the rst inventor kept the invention secret. A
crucial point assumed in the model is that it is common knowledge that A
has already innovated (Firm B knows that A has an invention, and which
one it is). This assumption implies that there are spillovers between both
rms, for example, through labor mobility, industrial espionage, informal
communication networks among inventors, or common suppliers (see Mans-
eld, 1985), and is commonly used in the literature (Scotchmer and Green,
1990 or Denicolò, 2000). As a consequence, the follower can choose whether
to invest in the invention already discovered and kept secret, or in the re-
maining invention.
If the leader chooses to rely on secrecy, both rms have to decide whether
or not to invest in the second invention in this race. In this case, as the
information on the rst invention is not disclosed, the race between the rms
is asymmetric. In other words, A will race at a speed , whereas B will race
at the same speed as in the initial race, .
The extend to which  and  di¤er can be interpreted as the technical
distance between the products. If  and  are close, it could reect a situation
in which two very di¤erent technical solutions are found to achieve the same
functional result, with more or less the same speed of discovery.
On the other hand, if the gap between  and  is high, the time of
discovery of the second product, conditional on having discovered the rst
product is commercialized but not patented, reverse engineering is easy, so that the leader
would lose its leading advantage. See, e.g., Scotchmer and Green (1990).
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one, is low. This implies that the discovery of the second product occurs
much more rapidly and suggests that it results from a small variation of the
technical characteristics of the rst product.
If the leader (rm A) discovers the second invention rst, the game ends
at this point. There is, however, the risk for the leader that the follower
might discover the second invention rst.
If the follower (rm B) is the winner of the second race after As secrecy
choice, the end of the game will depend on whether or not the follower has
chosen to race for the invention already discovered by the leader and kept
secret. If the invention is not similar, both rms will patent their respective
inventions: A will patent the invention previously kept secret, and B the
second invention. But if the invention is the same in both races, the follower
will patent it and a third race can take place for the remaining invention,
where, again, both rms will have to decide whether they will invest in it or
not.
In order to ease the exposition of the model at this point, we represent
a part of the timing in gure 4. The payo¤s indicated in the game tree
represent the discounted future prots, valued at the nal discovery date.
Lemma 5 It is a dominant strategy for rm A to invest continuously fol-
lowing a secrecy choice.
Proof. see appendix A
If Firm A chooses secrecy, it will always invest in the second race. This
comes from the fact that we assume that an invention kept secret cannot be
marketed.
4.2 The potential third race
In the case of secrecy, there may be a third stage of the game. This happens
if B chooses to invest in the same invention that rm A has kept secret
and discovers it before rm A has found the remaining invention. Firm B
will patent it and a race for the remaining innovation can arise (node 2).
Both rms will race at the same speed as they both have the same stock
15
Figure 4: Timing of the game after As choice of secrecy
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of knowledge. The continuation payo¤s look exactly the same as in table 1,
except that the payo¤s are inverted as, at this stage, B is considered to be
the leader (table 3).
Table 3: Continuation payo¤s if B patents the invention that A has kept secret
B
A
I N
I 

r
 c
2+r
;
( 1r+

r )+1 c
2+r
(r ) c
+r
;

r
+1
+r
N 0; 
1
r
+1 c
+r
0; 1
r
+ 1
The interpretations of the results are identical to those in section 3 with
the identities of the rms inverted.
4.3 The second race
If B decides to invest in the product already found and kept secret by A (Is),
there is a probability  that A achieves the invention in the time period dt.
In this case, the payo¤ to A will be 1=r and B will get 0.
There is also a probability  that B achieves the invention, in which case
the payo¤to A and B will be V S=ijA;3 and V
S=ij
B;3 , where V
S=ij
A;3 and V
S=ij
B;3 are given
in table 3 and depend on the decisions taken at node 2, with i; j = fI;Ng
and the superscript S denotes "secrecy".
If B chooses to invest in the product that has not been discovered by A
(Id), B nds it with probability . In this case, both rms have to share the
market and each of them gets a prot =r. With probability , rm A nds
the invention and gets the monopoly prot 1=r, whereas rm B gets 0.
The date of achieving this invention has an exponential distribution with
parameter (+ ). The net present values of the payo¤s are given in table
4.
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Table 4: Payo¤s depending on Bs choice to invest or not in the second invention
Is Id N
Payo¤ to A
 1
r
+V
S=ij
A;3  c
++r

r
+ 1
r
 c
++r
 1
r
 c
+r
Payo¤ to B
V
S=ij
B;3  c
++r

r
 c
++r
0
Lemma 6 We now briey summarize what the optimal best responses of
rm B will be in the second race after rm A has kept the rst invention
secret:
* Firm B will choose to invest in a di¤erent invention than the one already
discovered by rm A (Id) if the expected duopoly net of R&D costs are
positive (
r
> c), and if the expected duopoly prots of the second
race are greater than the expected payo¤s in the potential third race
(
r
> V
S=ij
B;3 ).
* Firm B will choose to invest in the same invention than the one already
discovered by rm A (Is) if the expected payo¤s net of R&D costs of
the potential third race are positive (V S=ijB;3 > c), and if the expected
payo¤s in the potential third race are greater than the expected duopoly
prots of the second race (V S=ijB;3 > 

r
).
* Firm B will choose not to invest in any invention, if both the expected
duopoly prots of the second race and the expected payo¤s of the poten-
tial third race (net of R&D costs) are negative (
r
< c and V S=ijB;3 < c).
Proof. These results are obtained by a simple comparison of the payo¤s in
table 4. See Appendix B for more details.
4.4 The decision to patent versus secrecy
Given the optimal responses of rm B to secrecy (section 4.3) and patenting
(section 3), what is the optimal choice of rm A?
At this stage of the game, the leader has to decide either to keep the rst
invention secret and race faster than the follower for the second invention,
18
or to patent and market the invention, which has the consequence that it
discloses its private information.
The Nash equilibrium of this sub-game is derived by comparing the pay-
o¤s to A when it has patented the rst invention and when it has relied on
secrecy.
Lemma 7 Firm A chooses between patenting and secrecy, only in the region
in which:
* The expected duopoly prots net of R&D costs are positive (
r
> c).
* The di¤erence between  and  is "high" (the threshold between "low" and
"high" being the condition  reported in corollary 2).
This region corresponds to the "Entry/II" region in gure 2.
In all the other regions, patenting is always preferred to secrecy.
Proof. See Appendix C. Table 6 in Appendix C summarizes the di¤erent
conditions, under which A is going to patent its rst invention based on the
decisions made at later stages.
This result can be explained as follows. If the expected duopoly prots
(net of R&D costs) are negative, a single product will be patented, as it has
been demonstrated in section 3. If the expected duopoly prots are positive,
but the di¤erence between  and  is low, secrecy is not attractive, as the
expected time of discovery is the same under both regimes, although rm A
cannot collect the interim prot if it chooses secrecy.
4.5 The rst race
At this stage (not represented in gure 4), we determine whether rms will
initially enter the race, which they will do only if their ex ante prots are
non-negative. Each of them has probability  of nding the rst invention,
and thus to be in the position of A (denoted earlier as the leader). With
probability , they are in position B (the follower). They both have to incur
the R&D cost for the rst invention. The payment of this cost ends when
the rst invention is discovered, which event has an exponential distribution
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with parameter 2: Thus, the ex ante prots, identical for both rms in the
rst race, are given by:
 =
V
y=ij
A;2 + V
y=ij
B;2   c
2+ r
With V y=ijk;2 being the future expected payo¤s of rm k = fA;Bg, dis-
counted to the beginning of the second race, depending on the choices i; j =
fI; Is; Id; Ng and y = fP; Sg. For simplicity we will assume that these ini-
tial payo¤s are positive, so that the rms will always enter the race initially.
Thus, we will suppose that  is such that   0. The conditions on  for
both rms to enter the race initially are reported in appendix D.
4.6 Description and discussion of the equilibria
We now characterize the equilibria of the game in the space (;). Given
that  > , we represent  on the interval [; 1]. We consider two di¤erent
cases, for di¤erent values of the initial hazard rate (), shown in gures 5 and
6. In order to simplify, we omit the "Entry" notation, so that the di¤erent
areas in the graphs are labeled with reference to the optimal choices, after
the rst invention has been found, with the same notation as in the rest of
the paper. The di¤erent regions are dened mathematically in appendix E.
First and foremost, note that in the "south-west" area (P/NN ) in both
gures, it is always optimal for the leader to patent the rst invention, and
then for both rms not to invest. The fact, that none of the rms invest
after the rst invention has been patented, is a consequence of competition
being tough. For rm B the prospect of duopoly prots does not justify an
investment in R&D, and then rm A has no reason to invest either.
Figure 5 shows the equilibria for  = 0:1. In the upper-left corner (P/NI),
the rst innovator patents the rst invention, as the technological advance
of keeping this invention secret is too low (i.e., the gap between  and  is
small). In addition, the leader will not invest for a second invention, whereas
the follower will stay in. The explanation for this, given that the degree of
competition and the hazard rate are low, is that it is more protable for
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the leader to share the prots in the future than to pay the cost of getting
involved in a second race.
In the area S/II s/II, the leader relies on secrecy, as the di¤erence between
 and  is high. Then, both rms invest for the second and the possible third
race, as competition is low and the instantaneous probability to be successful
( identical for both rms in the third race) is high.
However, the follower will drop out of the second race as soon as competi-
tion becomes stronger (S/IN ), and the leader continues to invest; the reason
is that, if a single invention is patented, the follower would invest in the
second one. Moreover, since an invention kept secret cannot be marketed, it
is optimal for the leader to continue to invest in a second race, even if the
follower drops out at this point.
Alternatively, when  is intermediate, it is more protable for the leader
to patent the rst invention in order to collect the interim prot (P/II).
Both rms will invest in a second race, and they have the same probability
to succeed.
Notice that, if the follower chooses to invest,it will always target the same
invention under secrecy. The choice to invest in the same invention, which
has already been discovered by rm A or in the other one, will determine if
a third race is going to take place in the case rm B wins the second race. A
third race can only occur if rm B chooses Is.
Proposition 8 If c 6 0:5, rm B will never choose to invest in a di¤erent
invention than the one previously discovered by rm A.
Proof. See Appendix F.
The intuition for this result is the following. Whether rm B chooses Is
or Id before the second race, the expected time of discovery, function of , is
the same. But if it chooses I d, rm B can get the duopoly prot if it wins
the second race. Thus, if the cost is low (i.e. c 6 0:5) rm B has nothing to
loose by choosing I s (or not invest at all, if the expected payo¤s net of R&D
costs are negative).
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Figure 5: Equilibria of the game: c = 0:2;  = 0:1; r = 0:3
Figure 6: Equilibria of the game: c = 0:2;  = 0:2; r = 0:3
Consider now gure 6 with  = 0:2. The situation is somewhat di¤erent,
as the benet of having the rst invention is lower for a given value of .
The leader will keep the invention secret for intermediate levels of com-
petition in order to keep the leading advantage, since the follower is going to
invest in any case. The leader will patent when the leading advantage is low
or intermediate. If the leader patents, the behaviour of the follower does not
depend on , but on , as all information is disclosed. Thus, not surprisingly,
rms will invest when  is high.
If we now compare both gures, two di¤erences appear when we increase
the initial hazard rate () in gure 6. The S/IN region from gure 5 dis-
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appears and, on the other hand, the "P/II" region increases in gure 6. In
this region, it becomes more protable for the leader to patent and collect
the interim prot.
The explanation is that, if the technological gap ( ) becomes smaller,
the follower will invest more often and the leader will rely on secrecy less
often.
Potential fences are raised as soon as one of the rms invests in both
inventions. The areas, where potential fences appear, are reported in the
graphs.
The above analysis and the conditions derived in tables 1 to 6 enable us
to make the following proposition:
Proposition 9 Potential fences of substitute inventions are created when the
duopoly prots net of R&D costs are positive. When the winner of the rst
race wishes to build a fence, it keeps the rst invention secret when the speed
of discovery of the second invention () is large relative to the competitors
().
Proof. See Appendix G
The intuition behind this result is the following: when the leader patents
the rst invention, it is not worth investing in the second invention for the
follower if the competition is strong, as the costs are larger than the expected
duopoly prots.
On the other hand, if the degree of competition is low, it might be prof-
itable for the rival rm to enter the market and for the leader to collect the
interim prot.
An interpretation of this result could be the following. If the di¤erence
between  and  is a measure of the technological gap between the inventions,
as it has been discussed in section 4.1 (the higher the di¤erence between 
and , the smaller the technological gap), this would mean that, if a rm
develops small variations of a product, the di¤erent versions would be kept
secret and patented once the last product has been discovered, creating a
fence with patents which have similar properties.
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Figure 7: Equilibria in First-to-Invent: c = 0:2;  = 0:1; r = 0:3
What would happen if the parameters had di¤erent values? If the cost c
is high, then the P/NN region would increase, and none of the rms would
ever invest in a second invention. On the other hand, if the cost is low, the
rms would always invest in both products.
The e¤ects of a variation of the parameter  are summarized in the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 10 If the speed of discovery of the follower under secrecy ()
increases, the leader will keep the rst invention secret for less parameter
values.
Proof. See appendix H
This result is rather intuitive: secrecy is only desirable if  is high com-
pared to . If the di¤erence between the two hazard rates decreases, the
leader will rely on secrecy in a lower number of cases.
4.7 Fences in First-to-Invent
Our analysis has so far been based on the rst-to-le system. Let us now
examine how the alternative legal rule applied in the United States a¤ects
the creation of patent fences.
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Figure 8: Equilibria in First-to-Invent: c = 0:2;  = 0:2; r = 0:3
The only di¤erence in the timing of the game appears at node 2 in gure
4. Even if B nds the second invention rst, the patent will be granted to
rm A. Thus, the payo¤s in the potential third race are the same as in table
1, as rm A will be the leader after the second race (meaning that rm A
has one patent and rm B does not have any). A simple comparison of the
payo¤s in table 4 (by replacing the payo¤s of the second race with those in
table 1) indicates that the follower will never choose to invest in the invention
already found by rm A under the First-to-Invent legal rule.
Lemma 11 Under the First-to-Invent legal rule, the follower will invest in
the invention that has not yet been found (Id) if the duopoly prots under se-
crecy net of R&D costs are positive (
r
> c), and will choose non-investment
otherwise.
Proof. This result is obtained by a simple comparison of the payo¤s in table
4.
This result can be explained as follows. If the follower chooses the same
invention (I s), the patent will be granted to rm A, whichever rm wins the
second race. The follower would then have to invest in the third race to be
able to get, at the best, the duopoly prot. On the other hand, if rm B
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chooses I d, it will then earn the duopoly prot after the second race, if it is
the rst to nd the second product.
Figures 7 and 8 describe the equilibria with the same parameter values
as in gures 5 and 6. We see from the graph that the leader patents the
rst invention for a wider range of values of  and  in the First-to-File
system. In the present case, the follower never invests if the leader keeps the
invention secret. Thus, the leader will only patent the invention for  close
to , where the benet of secrecy is low in order to collect the interim prot.
However the leader will keep the invention secret when the benet of secrecy
is large, as the high  makes the cost of the second invention very low as well
as it makes the follower drop out of the race. A more detailed comparison
between First-to-File and First-to-Invent is presented in the next section.
5 Welfare analysis
A recent NRC (2004) report raises concerns about the social benets of low
quality patent7:
"Granting patents for inventions that are not new, useful and
non-obvious unjustly rewards the patent holder at the expense of
consumer welfare." (NRC, 2004, p. 38)
This section aims at studying the welfare e¤ects of patent fences in two
ways. First, by comparing "strong" and "weak" novelty requirements and,
then, by comparing the First-to-File and First-to-Invent legal rules.
5.1 Comparing strong and weak novelty requirements
This section examines ex ante social welfare by comparing "strong" and
"weak" novelty requirement. The "strong" novelty requirement is here meant
to be a protection which follows the statutory denition of a patentable in-
vention regarding the inventive step, whereas the "weak" novelty requirement
refers to a situation in which the novelty step is not respected.
7The term "patent quality" refers here to the statutory denition of a patentable in-
vention: novelty, non-obviousness, usefulness
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Social welfare is dened as the sum of producer surplus, consumer surplus,
and a non-appropriable value of the rst innovation. For a variety of reasons
investors may not always be able to appropriate for themselves the entire
social benet of their innovations. Let s > 0 be the non appropriable value
of the innovations. It represents the increase in social welfare which rms in
other industries and their consumers may enjoy due to either knowledge or
demand spillovers. Due to the fact that both inventions are substitutes, we
will assume that there is a non-appropriable part to the rst invention only.
The second invention does not add anything to the stock of knowledge of the
society.
Let d() > 0 be the measure of deadweight loss reduction, due to com-
petition in the second race. We assume that this function is decreasing in
 such that d() < 0. The function has a lower bound: d(0:5) = 0, which
means that if competition is weak (for instance, if rms collude), there will
be no deadweight loss reduction. In order to reduce the notation, we will
omit the  argument in the function in the continuation of the text.
The private returns from the innovations are 1 in the case of monopoly,
and 2 in the case of duopoly. The aggregated R&D cost is c or 2c depending
on whether one rm or both of them are participating in the race.
As Green and Scotchmer (1995) and Denicolò (2000) have pointed out,
the social benet from an innovation includes the option value of investing
to obtain the second innovation, since a rm is favoured in the second race
if it already has the rst invention. This implies that an early invention is
valued more than a later one. If the rst innovation is patented, and both
rms invest in the second race, the expected social welfare, evaluated at the
beginning of the rst race is:
W P=II = P ()

1 + s
r
+


2+ r

2  1 + d
r

  2c

  2c (3)
Where P ()  2=(2 + r) represents the adjusted probability of in-
novating in the rst race, as in Denicolò (2000). The social welfare in the
rst race is measured as the sum of the private (monopoly) prot and the
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non-appropriable part.
In equation (3), the social welfare of the second race depends on which
rm wins this race. If the winner of the second race is the same as in the rst
one, which occurs with probability , the private prot remains unchanged,
and there is no reduction of the deadweight loss. Thus, the (net) social value
of the second invention is 0. With probability  the winner of the second
race is the follower. In this case, the private return of the second invention
will be 2  1 (which is likely to be negative), but there is a reduction of the
deadweight loss, measured by d().
The other welfare functions are reported in appendix I.
Since the follower will not invest in the same invention as the leader under
the First-to-Invent legal rule, equations (20) and (21) in appendix G have to
be taken out of the analysis in this case.
The possibility for rms to create a fence is only possible if the nov-
elty requirement is weak. Several studies report that the novelty and non-
obviousness criterion are not respected, resulting in "low-quality patents"
(Lunney, 2001; Hall et al., 2003). We now turn to this question, by studying
whether the policy makers should allow this weak novelty step, or require a
strong novelty step that does not allow a rm to patent an invention being
a substitute from an existing patented product. On the one hand, a weak
novelty step allows some extent of competition, given that rms can patent
substitute inventions, which is welfare improving. But on the other hand,
rms will be able to create fences to increase the scope of protection of their
inventions. In addition to anti-trust concerns (which are also raised in the
case of broad patents), this situation implies a "waste of R&D" due to the
duplication.
The welfare function under the strong novelty requirement is equivalent
to the W P=NN function in our model; after one invention has been patented,
the patentee benets from the monopoly rent, and none of the rms invest
to nd a substitute. This function can be compared to all the other welfare
functions in order to nd out which is the optimal policy.
Consider rst the choice S/IN, the case in which the leader keeps the rst
invention secret and then invests to nd the substitute, whereas the rival
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rm does not. In this situation we will have a fence with certainty.
W P=NN  W S=IN = 1 + s+ c
+ r
> 0 (4)
The comparison of both functions clearly shows that a single product is
socially preferable to a fence that will be built with certainty. The rst reason
is that the inventor keeps the initial invention secret which implies costs both
for the consumer (the product is introduced on the market at a latter stage)
and for the rm (no interim prots in the case of secrecy, duplication of R&D
expenses without any increase in prots). The second reason is that, in this
situation, there will not be any deadweight loss reduction.
If we compare the single-patent welfare function to the cases in which the
leader applies for a rst patent and a substitute patent is allowed, we get:
W P=NN  W P=II = 2c   (2  1 + d)
(2+ r)r
(5)
W P=NN  W P=NI = c   (2  1 + d)
(+ r)r
(6)
Equation (5) and (6) show that, a single patent is preferable to the case
where the policy maker allows for a substitute, if the expected social welfare
gain of duopoly is smaller than the aggregate cost of an additional invention.
For the remaining cases following a choice of secrecy by the leader, we
have:
W P=NN  W S=IId = (1 + s)(+ r)  (2+ s+ d)
r (+ + r)
+ 2c (7)
W P=NN  W S=IIs=II = 1 + s+ 2c(+ 2+ r)
+ + r
  (2  1 + d)
(+ + r) (2+ r) r
(8)
W P=NN  W S=IIs=NI = 1 + s+ 2c(+ 1:5+ r)
+ + r
  (2  1 + d)
(+ + r) (+ r) r
(9)
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The signs of equations (7) to (9) depend crucially on the size of s and
the shape of the d() function. If s is high, and/or d is low, the single patent
solution is the optimal policy, because s being high, an early disclosure (i.e.
the single patent solution) is socially optimal, compared to a late disclosure
(i.e.,the case where the rst product is kept secret).
The implications of these results are twofold. Equation (4) shows that
a single patent is socially preferable to a fence which would be built with
certainty. The only case in which the weak novelty requirement is socially
optimal, is when the deadweight loss compensates the decrease of the ex-
pected duopoly prot and/or when the non-appropriable part (s) is low.
5.2 Comparing First-to-File and First-to-Invent
Scotchmer and Green (1990) found that the First-to-Invent rule implies more
secrecy than the First-to-File rule in a similar framework, though with cu-
mulative innovations.
Dene S=IIs=II , S=IId and S=IN as the critical values under which rm
A keeps the rst invention secret, with the superscript referring to the choices
after the rst invention has been discovered. The values of these thresholds
have been calculated in section 4.4 and result from the comparison by A of
the payo¤s under secrecy and patenting.
Lemma 12 The rst innovators threshold for keeping the rst invention
secret is lowest if the subsequent choices are IId and highest if the choices are
IN: S=IN > S=IIs=II > S=IId.
Proof. See appendix J.
This result means that the leader has a higher incentive to keep the rst
invention secret, if it can prevent the follower from investing in the second
race. This incentive is lower if secrecy makes the follower choose to invest
in a di¤erent invention. In the First-to-Invent system, the inequality simply
becomes: S=IN > S=IId , as the follower never chooses to invest in the same
invention.
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Proposition 13 The leaders incentive for keeping the rst invention secret
is:
* larger or equivalent under the First-to-Invent legal rule than in the First-
to-File system, if the expected duopoly prots under secrecy net of R&D
costs are negative (
r
< c)
* larger or equivalent under the First-to-File system than in the First-to-
Invent system, if the expected duopoly prots under secrecy net of R&D
costs are positive (
r
> c)
Proof. Follows from lemma 10 and lemma 11.
If 
r
< c, rm B will always choose not to invest after secrecy under the
First-to-Invent legal rule, which is the region where secrecy is largest. Under
the First-to-File legal rule, the secrecy thresholds will be lower, as rm B can
also choose to invest in the same invention.
Scotchmer and Green (1990) argue that disclosure accelerates discovery,
so that patenting is always preferable. The implications are, however, di¤er-
ent in our model. As it has been shown in the previous sub-section, there
might be a wasteful duplication and then, secrecy can be better than patents
if it makes the follower drop out. It is however not clear in this model
whether the overall incentives to patent are greater under the First-to-File
or First-to-Invent legal rule.
From the previous discussion, we can make the following proposition:
Proposition 14 After secrecy, the follower will drop out of the race for more
parameter values under First-to-Invent than under First-to-File.
In this case, as well as in Scotchmer & Green (1990), a shake-out (i.e.
the follower drops out of after the rst invention has been discovered by the
leader) will occur for more parameter values with First-to-Invent. Again, the
conclusions we can draw are di¤erent. Scotchmer & Green (1990) argue that
a shake-out may be socially benecial. In our model, given that we allow for
di¤erent levels of competition between rms racing for substitute inventions,
the deadweight loss is likely to be reduced if both rms compete on the same
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market. The previous sub-section showed that the conclusion will depend on
the size of the deadweight loss reduction.
6 Conclusion
This paper has studied the behaviour of rms facing the decision to create
a patent fence, in the context of multiple stage patent races. We allowed
rms to choose between patenting their inventions or relying on secrecy for
di¤erent levels of competition.
We dene a "patent fence" as a set of substitute patents owned by the
same rm. Then, under a "weak novelty requirement" and applying the
First-to-File and First-to-Invent rules, it is shown that rms try to create
such fences of substitute inventions, when the duopoly prots net of R&D
costs are positive. We also show that in such a setup, rms will rely on
secrecy when the speed of discovery of the second invention is large, relative
to the competitors.
We also demonstrate that the First-to-Invent rule does not unnecessarily
imply more secrecy than the First-to-File system in this context. However,
under secrecy, the follower will drop out of the race more often under the
First-to-Invent legal rule, which is consistent with the previous results for
the case of cumulative innovations.
Finally, the welfare analysis shows that equilibrium outcomes where fences
occur with certainty are socially sub-optimal. The weak novelty requirement
(i.e. allowing patents for substitute products) is desirable, only if the dead-
weight loss is higher than the expected loss of private prots.
A recent sta¤ survey at the European Patent O¢ ce (EPO) shows that
"examiners at the European Patent O¢ ce (EPO) are losing condence in its
ability to ensure the quality of the patents it issues" and that "the pressure
to process les encourages them to approve marginal cases" (Pressured sta¤
loose faithin patent quality, Nature 429, 493, 03 June 2004). In contrast
with the US Patent O¢ ce (USPTO), the EPO has a "post-grant" opposition
system allowing any third party to attack a patent once it has been granted,
if the invention lacks novelty or an inventive step. Future work in that line
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of research could be to check how e¢ cient this opposition system is in trying
to improve the quality of the European patents.
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Appendix
A Proof of lemma 4
Following Scotchmer and Green (1990)s line of proof, we show that it is a
dominant strategy for A to invest at each moment of time after having kept
the rst invention secret, until the discovery of a second one.
I. If Firm B invests in the product which has not been found by rm A
(choice I d)
1. If A also invests (left hand side of inequality 16):
In the time period dt, A has a probability of  of achieving the nal
patent worth 1=r.
There is also a probability  that B achieves the patent worth =r.
In addition, there is a probability of (1  dt  dt) that neither rm
invents in dt.
2. If A does not invest (right hand side inequality 16)
There is also a probability  that B achieves the patent worth =r in the
time period dt
In addition, there is a probability of (1  dt) that rm B does not invent
in dt.
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If B also invests in the period dt, A should invest if:

1
r
+ 

r
  c

dt+ (1  dt  dt)PAe rdt  
r
dt+ (1  dt)PAe rdt
(10)
Where PA is As continuation value if neither rm invents.
After dividing by dt and letting dt go to 0; we get:
PA    cr
r
If A and B invest continuously, then the continuation value to A is:
 1
r
+
r
 c
++r
. The inequality is then satised
PA 
1
r
+ 
r
  c
+ + r
   cr
r
(11)
II. If B invests in the product which has been found by rm A (choice I s)
Inequality (16) becomes:


1
r
+ V
S=ij
A;3   c

dt+(1  dt  dt)PAe rdt  V S=ijA;3 dt+(1  dt)PAe rdt
(12)
Where V S=ijA;3 is the continuation payo¤to rm A, depending on the choices
made in the third race (see text and table 3).
This reduces to the same result as before: PA   crr .
Under these conditions, the continuation value to A is:
 1
r
+V
S=ij
A;3  c
++r
The
inequality is then satised
PA 
1
r
+ V
S=ij
A;3   c
+ + r
   cr
r
(13)
III. If B does not invest.
Then the relevant inequality becomes:

1
r
  c

dt+ (1  dt)PAe rdt  PAe rdt (14)
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Again, this reduces to the same result: PA   crr .
If A invests continuously and B does not invest, then the continuation
value to A is =r c
+r
: The inequality is then satised:
PA 
1
r
  c
+ r
   cr
r
(15)
Provided 1
r
 c i.e., that the expected monopoly prot is positive.
B Conditions for Firm B to invest after se-
crecy
Firm B compares the payo¤s under investment in the same invention, the
second invention and non-investment. This gives a lower bound for , above
which B is going to participate in the race.
I d is the optimal choice if it is preferred to N and I s. This creates two
conditions:

r
> c and 
r
> V
S=ij
B;3
In the same way, I s is the optimal choice if it is preferred to N and I d:
V
S=ij
B;3 > c and V
S=ij
B;3 >

r
The results, for the di¤erent possible choices in the third race.
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Table 5: Conditions for B to invest in the second race resulting from a secrecy choice by A
Conditions for Is to be optimal
Choices at node 2 Is preferred to Id Is preferred to N
II  < 1  cr
r+
 > rc(r+2+) (r+)

IN Is always optimal  >
r[c(r+)]

NN Is always optimal (1 + r) > cr
Conditions for Id to be optimal
Choices at node 2 Id preferred to Is Id preferred to N
II  > 1  cr
r+
IN Id never optimal r > c
NN Id never optimal
Conditions for N to be optimal
Choices at node 2 N preferred to Is N preferred to Id
II  < rc(r+2+) (r+)

IN  < r[c(r+)]


r
< c
NN 
r
(1 + r) < c
C Patent or secrecy?
To make the di¤erent choices comparable, the conditions on the parameters
that we derived before have to be the same. Since the potential third race in
the secrecy case as well as the second race in the patenting case are symmet-
ric, they are only comparable for symmetric choices (see tables 1 and 3). For
instance, the case where both rms invest in the potential third race after
a secrecy choice from A, denoted S/II/II, is only comparable with the P/II
choice, as the conditions on  are the similar in both cases. The case in which
rm B does not invest after As secrecy choice (S/IN ) has to be compared
to all the possible choices in the patenting case, as the conditions are not
totally symmetric and could overlap for some more restricted conditions.
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Table 6: Conditions for the leader to rely on secrecy.
Choices Alternative choices Conditions
(1) S/II s/II P/II  <   r2+( )+r(+c+)(r+)
(2) S/II s/IN P/NI
Never Nash equilibria
(alternative choice preferred)
(3) S/II d P/II  <   r2+( )+r(+c+ c)( )(r+)
(4) S/II d P/NI
Never Nash equilibria
(alternative choice preferred)
(5) S/IN P/II  < 1  r[r+(c+2)]
(+r)
(6) S/IN P/NI
Never Nash equilibria
(alternative choice preferred)
(7) S/IN
S/II s/NN
S/II d
P/NN
Never Nash equilibria
(alternative choice preferred)
We now justify why the choices (4), (6) and (7) can never be optimal.
(2) The comparison between the continuation payo¤s under the choices
S/II s/IN and P/NI gives the following condition for rm A to invest:  <
2 r2(1+c) r[+c(+)]
r0:5 (+r) . This condition does not bind, as the lower bound of the
P/NI region is given by cr

which is larger than 
2 r2(1+c) r[+c(+)]
r0:5 (+r) .
(4) The comparison between the continuation payo¤s under the choices
S/II d and P/NI gives the following condition for rm A to invest:  <
  (r+cr )(r+)+r
(r+) r < 0. The condition on  is negative and cannot be met.
(6) The comparison between the continuation payo¤s under the choices
S/IN and P/NI gives the following condition for rm A to invest:  <
1   r(c+1)

. This condition does not bind, as the upper bound of the P/NI
region is given by 1   cr(+r)
2
which is larger than 1   r(c+1)

, provided that
the expected monopoly prots net of R&D costs are positive, i.e., 
r
> c
(7) A simple comparison of the payo¤s in tables 1 and 4 shows that the
choices P/NN are preferred to any alternative choices.
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D The rst race
The ex-ante entry conditions under patenting have been computed in section
3 and are identical when we allow for secrecy. We now just need to nd these
conditions when the leader chooses secrecy, conditional on the subsequent
choices.
Table 7: Lower bound on  for positive ex ante prots under secrecy
Choices Conditions
II s
 [(2 )+r(+)]+cr[r+2r+2(+2+2)]
22
II d
cr(r++3) 
22
IN cr(r+)
 cr
E Description of the equilibria
Here, we derive the conditions for the di¤erent possible choices taken by the
rms to be optimal. We use the successive discounted payo¤s and associ-
ated conditions, that we found in the text for them to be equilibria in the
considered sub-games, presented in tables 1 to 6.
(1) P/II is the optimal choice if:
(i)  < 1  cr(+r)
2
Firm A invests in the second race (tables 1 and 2)
(ii) 
r
> c Firm B invests in the second race (tables 1 and 2)
(iii)  >   r2+( )+r(+c+)
(r+)
Firm A patents (tables 5 and 6)
(iv)  > 1  r[r+(c+2)]
(+r)
Firm A patents (tables 5 and 6)
(v)  >   r2+( )+r(+c+ c)
( )(r+) Firm A patents (tables 5 and 6)
(2) P/NI is the optimal choice if:
(i)  > 1  cr(+r)
2
Firm A does not invest in the second race (tables 1 and 2)
(ii) 
r
> c Firm B invests in the second race (tables 1 and 2)
(3) P/NN is the optimal choice if:
(i) 
r
< c : The rms do not invest in the second race (tables 1 and 2).
(4) S/II s/II is the optimal choice if:
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(i)  < 1  cr(+r)
2
Firm A invests in the potential third race (tables 1, 2,3)
(ii) 
r
> c Firm B invests in the potential third race (tables 1, 2,3)
(iii)  < 1  cr
r+
Firm B invests in the second race (tables 4 and 5)
(iv)  > rc(r+2+) (r+)

Firm B invests in the second race (tables 4 and 5)
(v)  <   r2+( )+r(+c+)
(r+)
Firm A keeps the rst invention secret (table 6)
(6) S/IN is the optimal choice if:
(i)  < 1  cr(+r)
2
Firm B does not invest in the second race (tables 4 and 5)
(ii) 
r
< c Firm B does not invest in the second race (tables 4 and 5)
(iii)  < 1  r(c+1)

Firm A keeps the rst invention secret (table 6)
(7) S/II d is the optimal choice if:
(i)  > 1  cr(+r)
2
Firm B invests in the second race (tables 4 and 5)
(ii) 
r
> c Firm B invests in the second race (tables 4 and 5)
(iii)  <   r2+( )+r(+c+ c)
( )(r+) Firm A keeps the rst invention secret (table 6)
F Proof of proposition 7
According to the results in table 7, I d is preferred to I s if  > 1  crr+ . The
intercept of this curve in the space (; ) is 1  c and the function is strictly
increasing: @
@
(1   cr
r+
) = cr
(r+)2
> 0. Thus, if c 6 0:5, rm B will never
choose I d.
G Proof of Proposition 8
The proposition consists of two parts:
1) Potential fences of substitute inventions are created when the duopoly
prots are positive:
This result is straightforward and is obtained from tables 1 to 6.
2) When rms wish to build fences, they keep the rst invention secret
when the benet of secrecy (the speed of discovery) is large relative to the
competitors.
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We have to show that rms keep their rst inventions secret when  is
large relative to . Table 6 shows the conditions under which secrecy is
preferred to patenting by reporting an upper bound on . To prove our
statement, we just need to show that these boundaries (1, 3 and 5 in table
6) are upward slopping. 8 2 [; 1];  2 [0; 1]; r > 0; and c > 0, we compute
the rst order derivatives and show that they are positive in the space (; ):
(1) @
@
n
  r2+( )+r(+c+)
(r+)
o
=
r[r2+2r+(2+c)2]+(r+)2
2(r+)2
> 0
(3) @
@
n
  r2+( )+r(+c+ c)
( )(r+)
o
=  2+r[ c+r+(2+c)]+(r+)
2
(r+)
+ c+(1+c)r
2+2cr 22
(r+)2( ) >
0
(5) @
@
n
1  r[r+(c+2)]
(+r)
o
= r
h
1+c
(r+)2
+ 1
2
i
> 0
H Proof of proposition 9
We need to show that the conditions for rm A to keep the invention secret
are decreasing with respect to . We take the conditions in table 6:
(1) @
@
n
  r2+( )+r(+c+)
(r+)
o
=  r(r+2)
(r+)( ) < 0
(3) @
@
n
  r2+( )+r(+c+ c)
( )(r+)
o
=  1

< 0
Condition (5) does not depend on  and is thus constant when  varies.
I Welfare functions
Regarding the cases in which the rst invention is patented, we have:
W P=NI = P ()

1 + s
r
+ P ()

2  1 + d
r

  c

  2c (16)
W P=NN = P ()

1 + s
r

  2c (17)
Where P ()  =(+ r)
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Under secrecy, the rst invention is not disclosed before the second inven-
tion has been discovered, so that the social benets are delayed to the date
when the inventions are patented and commercialized. We have8:
W S=IN = P ()P ()

1 + s
r
  c

  2c (18)
W S=IId = P ()


+ + r

1 + s
r

+

+ + r

2+ s+ d
r

  2c

  2c
(19)
W S=IIs=II = P ()


+ + r

1 + s
r

+

+ + r

W P=II + 2c
P ()

  2c

 2c
(20)
W S=IIs=IN = P ()


+ + r

1 + s
r

+

+ + r

W P=NI + 2c
P ()

  2c

 2c
(21)
J Proof of lemma 11
We want to show that S=IN > S=IIs=II > S=IId , where the  are the critical
values in table 6 under which rm A will rely on secrecy.
We have:
S=IN   S=IId = r(r+2)
(r+)( ) > 0
S=IId   S=IIs=II = 

> 0
S=IIs=II   S=IId = [r(r++)+( )]
(r+)( ) > 0
Thus, S=IN > S=IIs=II > S=IId
8WS=IIs=NN is not reported here, since the choice corresponding to this welfare function
is always dominated (the leader will always prefere patenting, see table 6).
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